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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, both the United Kingdom and the United States passed landmark
legislation transforming the regulation of financial markets and institutions in those
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countries. The United Kingdom enacted the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000
(FSMA),' and the United States passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLB).
2
These laws respond to some common challenges faced in twenty-first century financial
regulation: far-reaching globalization, advanced industry consolidation, persistent
competition, and incessant technological advances.
Recent trends in financial services challenge the regulatory constructs devised in the
last century. Traditionally, regulatory structures have been institution based with separate
regulators for banking, securities, and insurance. This structure was premised on the
existence of relatively clear distinctions between each business line. The products offered
by each industrial sector were relatively easy to categorize, for example, in terms of the
3distinction between debt, equity, and insurance contracts. Similarly, institutions were
easily distinguished and categorized into those that took deposits (commercial banks), sold
securities (investment banks), and offered insurance (insurance companies). Accordingly,
the businesses of banking, securities, and insurance were regulated as if they were separate
industries, subject to separate statutes, and administered by separate regulatory agencies.
The fading of such distinctions has forced policy makers to reevaluate the structure of
regulation given this evolution. Moreover, these trends have resulted in significant changes
to the nature and distribution of risk in the financial system: Banks have acquired market
risks that were once exclusively borne by securities firms, while securities firms have been
exposed to bank-type risk through their acquisition of securitized bank assets. These
developments demand a policy response that we call "regulatory modernization."
Regulatory modernization must be understood in its relationship to and distinctiveness
from the often discussed "financial modernization." Financial modernization is represented
by legislation that removes previous structural restrictions on financial intermediaries. The
quest for financial modernization has received extensive legislative attention, particularly in
the United States. We believe, however, that regulatory modernization is a far more
compelling policy issue. Regulatory modernization is the process of reforming the
organization and practices of financial regulation to mirror the economic realities of today's
financial services sector. Debate regarding regulatory modernization assumes the
implementation of financial modernization policies-which are essentially deregulatory-
and deconstructs the remaining regulatory framework to determine if it suits the new
financial landscape. The FSMA, which creates a single regulator for all financial services
firms, exemplifies an attempt to address regulatory modernization.4
This article will examine whether new legislation in the United Kingdom and the
United States is successful in addressing the policies associated with regulatory
modernization. Part II provides a brief context and background to the policy goals of
financial modernization versus regulatory modernization and argues for concentration on
regulatory modernization in the reform of finance laws. Part III and Part IV examine the
extent to which the policies of regulatory modernization are met under the GLB and the
FSMA respectively. We will show that the GLB and FSMA take quite different
approaches to these issues. The divergence is not surprising given the long-standing
differences in character of financial regulation in Britain versus the United States, 5 but they
1. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8 (Eng.), available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/
acts2000/20000008.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2003).
2. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.) (2001).
3. Professor Macey has argued that product distinctions persist today. Jonathan R. Macey, The Business of
Banking: Before and After Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 25 IOWA J. CORP. L. 691, 712 (2000).
4. See discussion infra Part IV.
5. Historically, the United States has distinguished itself by having the most complex and restrictive set of
rules governing financial institutions. Moreover, the style of regulation in the United States is a very formal one
[VOL. 38:317
REGULATORY CHALLENGES OF MODERN FINANCIAL MARKETS
also point to a much deeper philosophical difference between the two pieces of legislation.
In Part V, we conclude with a broader comparative analysis in which the legislative
approaches in the two countries are contrasted with trends in other leading industrialized
countries. Finally, we offer our predictions and recommendations for future reform.
II. FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION VERSUS REGULATORY MODERNIZATION
Central to our thesis is the distinction between financial and regulatory modernization.
Financial modernization seeks the removal of structural restraints, which segment markets
and confine institutions to specific business lines. We begin with a brief background of
financial modernization, discuss its link to regulatory modernization, and then set forth the
importance of regulatory modernization to the effectiveness of regulation of modernized
financial markets.
A. Overview of Financial Modernization
The goal of financial modernization is to allow competitive forces, rather than legal
rules, to dictate the supply of services and structure of firms. Financial modernization
rejects the segmentation of financial services and markets established by the New Deal.
The most well known of these restrictions in the United States was the Banking Act of
1933, also known as the Glass-Steagall Act.6 Glass-Steagall, passed as part of the New
Deal package, restricted banks from engaging in most securities business activities 7 and
separated the business of commercial banking from the business of investment banking.
8
The current consensus of academic opinion now regards structural regulations as
detrimental to safety and soundness. Past concerns about excessive concentrations of
economic power9 and conflicts of interest inherent in multicapacity financial groups have
been overridden by the recognition that structural deregulation can reduce risk through
portfolio diversification. Consequently, much contemporary academic thinking, followed
more slowly by policy-making practice, stresses the importance of leaving the
determination of financial group forms to the operation of the market.
that relies heavily on the rule of law as opposed to agency discretion. In contrast, the United Kingdom has
imposed relatively fewer restrictions on the activities of financial institutions and has relied on an informal, moral
suasion style of regulatory control. For further comparison of bank regulation in the United States and the United
Kingdom, see Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Michael Taylor, Convergence and Competition: The Case of Bank
Regulation in Britain and the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 595, 647-50 (1999).
6. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.
(2000)).
7. Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act prohibits national banks from engaging in most underwriting. 12
U.S.C. § 24 (2000). Significantly, Section 16 was not repealed by GLB, although many other sections of the
Glass-Steagall Act were. See discussion infra Part III.B.
8. Section 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act prohibits any firm "engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting,
selling, or distributing" securities from also engaging in the deposit-taking business. 12 U.S.C. § 378 (2000).
Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act prohibited member banks, such as national banks and state member banks,
from affiliating with any firm "engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution"
of securities. Glass-Steagall Act, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162, repealed by 12 U.S.C. § 377 (2000).
9. Concentration of economic power appears to have been especially influential with the drafters of the 1933
Banking Act in the United States. See SUSAN EASTERBROOK KENNEDY, THE BANKING CRISIS OF 1933, at 207-08
(1974). The United States' approach was very influential in post-war Japan, which modeled its restrictions on
banks' securities activities on those of the United States. However, the Occupation Authorities in Germany were
much less successful in exporting their model of finance to that country.
2003]
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
Some countries have adopted financial modernization more rapidly than others.' ° For
example, the United Kingdom, which relied on informal measures and customary
understandings rather than statute law to segment its financial markets, removed its
structural regulations rapidly during the mid-1980s, mistakenly believing that the United
States was already moving in the same direction. This process was symbolized by the 1986
"Big Bang" in the City of London, in which institutional membership in the Stock
Exchange was permitted for the first time." By contrast, the process of removing structural
barriers in the United States has been much slower, and the passage of GLB was preceded
by a twenty-year struggle to enact financial modernization legislation. Although the debate
on new financial legislation began in the early 1980s, Congress seemed unable to pass any
modernization bills. Impatience with the legislative process led banking regulators,
primarily the Federal Reserve, to permit incremental expansion by banks into the securities
markets through progressively more liberal interpretations of the "engaged principally"
clause of Section 20 of Glass-Steagall. 12 Finally, GLB put the legislative stamp of approval
on these early agency efforts at modernization.
B. Financial Modernization Forces Reconsideration of Regulatory Structure
While debate regarding financial modernization concerns the extent to which the
structure and function of financial groups should be left to the functioning of the market
and private ordering, regulatory modernization takes the market approach as a given. The
removal of structural regulations in other jurisdictions provides ample evidence of what
form of financial system will result from structural deregulation.
1. Blurred Boundaries
In announcing the decision to create a single financial regulator in the United
Kingdom, Gordon Brown, MP, Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer (finance minister)
argued that:
[I]t is clear that the distinctions between different types of financial
institutions-banks, securities firms and insurance companies-are becoming
increasingly blurred. Many of today's financial institutions are regulated by a
plethora of different supervisors. This increases the cost and reduces the
effectiveness of supervision.' 
3
10. Until the passage of GLB, the United States was practically alone among the industrialized economies in
persisting with structural regulation of banking. In the European Union, the model of the universal bank,
enshrined in the Second Banking Co-ordination Directive, prevails. Japan has recently repealed Section 65 of its
Securities Act (similar in effect to the Glass-Steagall Act) as part of its "Big Bang" financial deregulation and has
further moved to eliminate restrictions on holding company structures.
11. "Institutional" membership in this context primarily meant membership by limited liability banks, many
of them foreign. NORMAN S. POSER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION: LONDON'S "BIG BANG" AND THE
EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKET 30-32 (1991). Previously, Stock Exchange membership had been limited to
firms adopting the partnership form. Id. at 19-20.
12. For a discussion of agency interpretation of Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act, see Heidi Mandanis
Schooner, Regulating Risk Not Function, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 441, 444-47 (1998).
13. Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown, Speech to the House of Commons, 294 PARL. DEB., H.C.
(6th ser.) (1997) 510.
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The once bright-line boundaries between the banking, securities, and insurance
industries are now blurred. 14 This evolution has forced a reconsideration of the basic
structure of financial regulation and was part of the justification for the major regulatory
reform embarked on in the United Kingdom with the passage of the FSMA. Although this
may not be the only, or even the primary, reason for the radical reforms currently under
way in the United Kingdom,' 5 it has nevertheless featured in the British debate to an extent
that has no parallel in the United States. A similar process has been under way in Australia,
which has also embarked on a radical overhaul of its financial regulatory structure.
Significantly, and unlike the process in the United Kingdom, the Australian reforms were
made after detailed consideration of the issues posed by the new financial landscape by a
commission of inquiry (the Financial System Inquiry, also known as the Wallis
Commission after the name of its chairman). 16
2. Conglomeration and Functional Despecialization
The blurring of boundaries between the traditional financial sectors can be
deconstructed into two overlapping, yet distinct, phenomena: the conglomeration of
institutions and functional despecialization. Both conglomeration and functional
despecialization support the need for regulatory modernization. First, as the boundaries-
whether legal or customary-segregating different types of financial activity have been
dismantled, new types of financial firms have emerged, combining at least two of the
activities of banking, securities, and insurance. 17 As a result, group structures have become
more complex and are tending to resemble conglomerate forms, which involve a diversity
of institutions operating in a range of different sectors and geographical locations and are
subject to different supervisory regimes. Banks are becoming increasingly involved in
asset management and broker-dealing activities, while securities houses have increasingly
taken on bank-type financial risks. Banking/insurance linkages are also becoming
commonplace, usually under a common holding company structure. Given these
developments, the Tripartite Group of G10 banking, securities, and insurance supervisors
argued in its 1995 report that a "group-wide" perspective is required to obtain an adequate
supervisory overview of these financial conglomerates.' 8 This is difficult to achieve while
regulation remains structured according to the outdated industrial categories.
14. See CLAUDIO E.V. BORIO & RENATO FILOSA, THE CHANGING BORDERS OF BANKING: TRENDS AND
IMPLICATIONS (Bank for Int'l Settlements, Economic Paper No. 43, 1994), available at http://www.bis.org/fsi (last
visited Mar. 20, 2003); MICHAEL TAYLOR, "TWIN PEAKS": A REGULATORY STRUCTURE FOR THE NEW CENTURY
(1995) [hereinafter TAYLOR, TWIN PEAKS]; MICHAEL TAYLOR, PEAK PRACTICE: HOW TO REFORM THE UK's
REGULATORY SYSTEM (1996); CHARLES GOODHART, SOME REGULATORY CONCERNS (London Sch. of Econ.,
Financial Markets Group Special Paper No. 79, 1995), available at http://fmg.lse.ac.uk/pdfs/sp0079.pdf (last
visited Mar. 20, 2003); AUSTL. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL SYSTEM INQUIRY: DISCUSSION PAPER
(1996), available at http://fsi.treasury.gov.au/content/publications.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2003); AUSTL. DEP'T.
OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL SYSTEM INQUIRY: FINAL REPORT (1997), available at
http://fsi.treasury.gov.au/content/publications.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2003) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT];
Schooner, supra note 12, at 44.
15. As discussed infra Part IV.A, regulatory reform in the United Kingdom followed closely on the heels of a
number of domestic financial "scandals" as well as changes to the monetary policy arrangements introduced by the
incoming Labour government in May 1997.
16. FINAL REPORT, supra note 14.
17. The creation of Citigroup, the product of the merger of Citibank and Travelers Insurance, is an often-
cited example.
18. Bank for Int'l Settlements, The Supervision of Financial Conglomerates, (Report of the Tripartite Group
of Banking, Securities, & Insurance Supervisors), July 1995, at 16.
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The second dimension of industry developments that underpin the case for regulatory
modernization might be described in general terms as "functional despecialization."
Different financial institutions are increasingly serving the same or similar economic
functions. Moreover, technological innovation has created products that cannot be easily
accommodated within the traditional contractual forms of debt, equity, and insurance (e.g.,
credit derivatives). Financial innovation has increased dramatically the marketability and
standardization of financial products. It has allowed the creation, concurrently, of more
complex products and the unbundling of certain types of risk into their separate
components. 19  In addition, contract standardization and the unbundling of risks has
permitted different financial institutions to take on exposure to risks that were previously
outside their sectoral domain. Combined with considerable progress in the quality and
effectiveness of internal risk management systems, and the emergence of new instruments
for managing risks, the risk profiles of banks and other types of financial intermediaries
have begun to converge. The recent growth of securitization is one manifestation of this
trend. As a result, securities houses will increasingly be exposed to the type of risk that is
typical of traditional banking business, as their assets include, for example, mortgage-
backed securities or securitized bank loans. Similarly, bank balance sheets-previously
characterized by their stability-are now subject to much greater volatility, as assets can be
securitized and sold and trading activities account for a much larger share of profitability.
20
The banking industry in the United States provides an excellent example of the
process of functional despecialization. A number of studies during the 1990s have stressed
that banks are diminishing in importance, at least measured in terms of their share of
financial sector assets.2 1 In the United States, the bank share of total financial sector assets
was stable throughout the 1960s to the early 1980s at around forty percent; by the late
1990s this share had fallen to twenty-two percent.22 In the place of bank loans and
deposits, securities and mutual funds have developed as the leading providers of credit and
repositories of financial wealth. Not only has this trend diminished the relative importance
of banks as the main type of financial intermediary within the system, but it has also
resulted in a change in their risk profile.23 In particular, the squeeze on banks' net interest
margins brought about by borrowers switching directly to the securities markets has
resulted in a shift away from banks' traditional lending activities. As a result, banks have
begun to rely on trading activities as a substantial source of their income, changing their
risk characteristics to resemble much more closely those of securities brokers and dealers.
This process has been most pronounced in the United States. To a lesser extent, the decline
of banking can also be observed in Britain, Japan, and France. However, in several other
leading industrialized economies this trend is not yet apparent.2 4
19. See Julie L. Williams, Speech Before the American Banker's Second Account Aggregation Conference
(April 23, 2001), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2001-39.txt (last visited Mar. 20, 2003)
(discussing the "deconstruction of the banking business [which] means the separation or segmentation of products,
services, operations and information into component parts or processes so that they can be provided or obtained
separately").
20. For further discussion of these issues, see Michael Taylor, Towards a New Regulatory Paradigm, 49
MERCER L. REV. 793 (1998).
21. Franklin R. Edwards & Frederic S. Mishkin, The Decline of Traditional Banking: Implications for
Financial Stability and Regulatory Policy, FRBNY ECON. POL'Y REV., July 1995 at 27, 28-29.
22. ROBERT E. LITAN & JONATHAN RAUCH, AMERICAN FINANCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 63 (1997).
23. Id.; Edwards & Mishkin, supra note 21, at 28.
24. See the figures cited in H.J. BLOMMESTEIN & K. BILTOFT, Trends, Structural Changes and Prospects in
OECD Capital Markets, in THE NEW FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE FORCES SHAPING THE REVOLUTION IN BANKING,
RISK MANAGEMENT, AND CAPITAL MARKETS 287 (OECD ed., 1995), especially as they apply to Germany. The
German financial system remains highly intermediated, although recent attempts by policy makers to encourage the
growth of securities markets may result in the disintermediation trend also becoming apparent there over time. In
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C. U.S. and U.K. Models of Regulatory Modernization
The emergence of financial conglomerates and the process of functional
despecialization press the case for regulatory modernization. As Borio and Filosa note,
"[C]onglomeration and the blurring of distinctions between activities.., raise the question
of the appropriate allocation of responsibilities between different supervisors."" In the
United States, an often-cited solution is functional regulation. 26 Alan Greenspan described
functional regulation "as a system in which each separate 'function'-such as commercial
banking, investment banking, or mortgage banking-is supervised by the same regulatory
body, regardless of the function's location within a particular financial institution.
' ' 7
Functional regulation is an example of regulatory modernization to the extent that it rejects
the institutional regulation model under which regulatory divisions are determined by entity
type. The growth of financial conglomerates makes institutional regulation difficult to
sustain. However, functional regulation has its limitations as well, not the least of which is
its reliance on functional (i.e., product or activity) categories. Functional regulation is best
understood as an outgrowth of U.S. federal securities law under which a panoply of
disclosure, anti-fraud, and enforcement provisions hinge on the definition of a "security. 28
The reliance on functional regulation under such a regime makes perfect sense since the
substantive regulation is triggered by the type of product offered-a security. However, the
application of a functional regulatory scheme in the context of bank regulation is
problematic. Traditional bank regulation is not tied to the products offered but to the
solvency of institutions offering those products. Functional regulation, with its focus on
products, is not a natural fit when safety and soundness of institutions is the regulatory
goal.
An alternative approach to regulatory modernization argues that since the boundaries
between financial sectors are being eroded, regulation itself should follow suit. A single
financial regulator, like Britain's Financial Services Authority (FSA),29 which can dispense
with the old boundary lines between banking, securities, and insurance, would seem to be
better adapted to the realities of modern financial markets than the traditional tripartite
structure of regulation. Such an agency also enjoys the advantage of being able to monitor
the activities of a complex group in exactly the same way as the internal management of a
conglomerate monitors its activities. As a result, the regulatory process can mirror the
management process, conforming to the economic realities of the group rather than its legal
form. This philosophy seems to lie behind the thinking of Britain's FSA in its decision to
create a division dealing exclusively with so-called "complex" groups.
3
0
As we will show in the next two sections, FSMA and GLB take radically different
approaches toward regulatory modernization. In the United Kingdom, the process of
other countries, especially those in development or transition, banks remain the most dominant form of financial
intermediary. See WORLD BANK, 1999 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 76 (1999).
25. BORIO & FILOSA, supra note 14.
26. See generally Schooner, supra note 12.
27. Chairman Alan Greenspan, Remarks Before the 31st Annual Conference on Bank Structure and
Competition (May 11, 1995).
28. For example, a firm is not a dealer (and therefore subject to federal regulation) unless the firm is "engaged
in the business of buying and selling securities for [its] own account." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(5),
15 U.S.C. § 78a (1934) (emphasis added). Similarly, a firm is not a broker unless it is "engaged in the business of
effecting transactions in securities for the account of others." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(4), 15
U.S.C. § 78a (1934) (emphasis added).
29. See infra Part IV.C.
30. See CLIVE BRIAULT, THE RATIONALE FOR A SINGLE NATIONAL FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATOR
(Financial Serv. Auth., Occasional Paper Series No. 2, 1999).
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financial modernization was completed prior to the passage of FSMA, and therefore the
primary function of FSMA was regulatory modernization. In contrast, in the United States,
the focus of GLB was on financial modernization, with regulatory modernization taking on
only residual importance. The FSMA creates a single regulator for most of the financial
services sector and creates the concept of a single authorization to conduct financial
services business. By contrast, GLB is concerned with dismantling New Deal-era structural
regulation, and the regulatory issues that this dismantling created received scant attention.
Insofar as GLB takes these issues into account, it has opted for a continuation of
institutionally based regulation with the Federal Reserve being assigned the role of an
overarching "umbrella" regulator of financial services groups. To the extent that GLB
recognizes that there is a problem in need of solution, this approach may at best be a
temporary stop-gap measure, and it is, perhaps, significant that it runs counter to what
would appear to be an emerging international trend toward regulatory modernization, at
least in the industrialized world.
III. THE UNITED STATES' GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT: LONG-AWAITED,
OVERSHADOWED, AND OBSOLETE
GLB distinguishes itself among the major banking bills as one that accomplished
relatively little with regard to prudential regulation and supervision. As discussed below,
Congress' remarkable inability to pass financial modernization legislation over the last
twenty years resulted in a bill that will have a relatively minor impact on the United States'
bank regulatory regime. More importantly, however, is that GLB, when viewed in the
context of international banking regulatory developments, was obsolete at the time of its
passage. GLB failed to address, in any significant way, the realities of financial markets
that have already modernized.
A. Just One Step Down the Road to Financial Modernization
Initiatives of the Fed and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
achieved significant deregulation of banks' activities restrictions prior to the passage of
GLB. Beginning in 1987, the Fed approved securities activities housed in non-bank
subsidiaries of bank holding companies. 31  Such activities were subject to revenue
limitations and firewalls. Over time, as the Fed became more and more comfortable with
the new activities, the revenue limitations rose incrementally and the firewalls fell. By the
time GLB was passed, the revenue limitations stood at twenty-five percent of the
subsidiaries' gross revenue,32 and nearly all of the firewalls had been eliminated.33
Similarly, in 1996, the OCC adopted a controversial rule (commonly known as the "op-
sub" rule) that allowed national banks to acquire or establish a subsidiary that could engage
in activities that would not have been permissible for the bank itself.34 Thus, the regulatory
framework prior to GLB allowed Citicorp, a commercial bank, and Travelers, an insurance
and investment banking firm, to announce their intent to merge. The Fed approved their
merger on September 23, 1998.35
31. See 73 FED. RES. BULL. 473 (1987).
32. See Revenue Limit on Bank-Ineligible Activities of Subsidiaries of Bank Holding Companies Engaged in
Underwriting and Dealing in Securities, 61 Fed. Reg. 687750 (Dec. 30, 1996).
33. See Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control (Regulation Y), 12 C.F.R. § 225 (1997).
34. See Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 12 C.F.R. §§ 3, 5, 6, 7, 16, 18 (1996).
35. Order Approving Formation of a Bank Holding Company and Notice to Engage in Nonbanking Activities,
84 FED. RES. BULL. 985 (1998).
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GLB continues the incremental course originally charted by the Fed. Under GLB,
financial holding companies (i.e., bank holding companies that are well capitalized, well
managed, and whose banks have a satisfactory Community Reinvestment Act36 rating) may
engage in any activity that is "financial in nature or incidental to such financial activity; or
is complementary to a financial activity and does not pose a substantial risk to the safety or
soundness of depository institutions or the financial system generally. ' 37 The Act lists
various activities as financial in nature, including insurance and securities underwriting,
and, perhaps most significantly, merchant banking.38 Thus, under GLB a financial holding
company and its non-bank subsidiaries may, for example, engage in unlimited securities
activities. The consequences for failure to maintain status as a financial holding company
are harsh. If, for example, a financial holding company fails at any point to maintain the
necessary capitalization or management status, the Fed could force a sale of any subsidiary
bank or order the financial holding company to cease any new activities (i.e., activities not
previously permissible for a bank holding company).39
While GLB offers great potential for new activities under the financial holding
company rubric, the rules for banks and their subsidiaries are not so generous. Under GLB,
a national bank (one that is well capitalized and well managed) 40 may own a "financial
subsidiary" that engages in activities that are not permissible to the bank itself. Financial
subsidiaries may engage in the same activities as financial holding companies with two
important exceptions. First, financial subsidiaries, as opposed to financial holding
companies, are not permitted to underwrite insurance or annuity contracts, develop or
invest in real estate, or engage in merchant banking or insurance portfolio investing.4 1
Second, financial subsidiaries are subject to a cap on assets equal to the lesser of forty-five
percent of the consolidated total assets of the parent bank or fifty billion dollars.42
The restrictions placed on financial subsidiaries represent a compromise in the hard-
fought battle between Treasury and the Fed regarding the placement of new activities
within the holding company structure. The dispute was argued on substantive grounds,
with the Fed asserting that banks enjoy a government subsidy by way of federal deposit
insurance and therefore should not be permitted to engage in new activities that would
allow them to compete, unfairly, against firms that do not enjoy the subsidy.4 3 Treasury
officials countered that no net subsidy exists and that the law should allow for maximum
flexibility in the organizational structure of financial services firTiS.44 Many commentators,
however, viewed the debate as one over turf. The Fed sought to house new activities
within its sector of authority: in the holding company and the holding company's non-bank
subsidiaries. While Treasury's position also sought OCC authority over new activities, its
36. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(l) (2000).
37. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1) (2000). Contrast the "financial in nature" standard with the more restrictive
standard set for bank holding company activities, i.e., "so closely related to banking to be a proper incident
thereto." 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (2000). The "so closely related" standard continues to apply to bank holding
companies that do not choose to become financial holding companies.
38. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4) (2000). See also 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (2000) (describing merchant banking
activities). Despite the theoretical significance of the new merchant banking powers, few financial holding
companies have taken advantage of this new power. Only twenty-two out of the almost 600 financial holding
companies have engaged in merchant banking. Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1941, at 6-7 (Dec. 7, 2001).
39. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(m)(4)(B) (2000).
40. 12 U.S.C. § 24a (2000).
41. Id.
42. Id. § 24a(a)(2)(D).
43. See Constance Z. Wagner, Structuring the Financial Service Conglomerates of the Future: Does the
Choice of Corporate Form to House New Financial Activities of National Banks Matter?, 19 ANN. REv. BANKING
L. 329, 392 (2000).
44. Id. at 400-0 1.
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position on the substantive argument-the absence of a government subsidy-had the
support of many leading experts.45 Despite this support, perhaps owing to the tremendous
political power of Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan and/or the lack of political power of the
Clinton Administration, Treasury was forced to compromise on its position as is evidenced
by the restrictions placed on financial subsidiaries under GLB.
B. Repeal of Glass-Steagall Is Overshadowed by New Regulatory Demands
In the last century, the most significant U.S. banking bills were passed in the wake of
catastrophic bank failures and, therefore, not surprisingly, those laws were prudential in
nature, i.e., the purpose of the legislation was to secure the safety and soundness of banking
institutions. The most obvious example is Glass-Steagall, 46 which was passed in response
to the bank failures of the Great Depression. The more recent examples are the Federal
Financial Reform Recovery Act of 1989 (FIRREA)47 and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA).48 Both FIRREA and FDICIA were passed in
response to the S&L and banking crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s. These crises
provided the momentum and opportunity that would have been politically unavailable in a
different climate, and Congress included bold measures in each of these statutes.49
GLB is not legislation that was passed in response to a major banking crisis.
Therefore, it is no surprise that as a prudential bill GLB contains no truly bold measures.
The repeal of Glass-Steagall would have been a bold deregulatory measure if the repeal had
been complete.50 As discussed earlier, however, the repeal of Sections 20 and 32 of Glass-
Steagall serve primarily as a congressional stamp of approval on increasingly aggressive
administrative interpretation. Time will tell whether new insurance powers, for example,
will have any real impact. GLB has not sparked the slew of mergers that some anticipated
and others feared. 5'
The deregulatory aspects of GLB pale in comparison to the new regulatory measures
it imposes. Regulatory measures contained in GLB include: privacy, ATM reform,
45. Seeid at391.
46. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.
(2000)).
47. Federal Financial Reform Recovery Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (2000)).
48. Federal Deposit Insurance Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991)
(codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (2000)).
49. Glass-Steagall established federal deposit insurance and the FDIC, separated the businesses of commercial
and investment banking, permitted national banks to branch, prohibited the payment of interest on demand
deposits, and gave the Fed the authority to regulate interest paid on time deposits. FIRREA was passed to rescue
the thrift federal deposit insurance fund but only included powerful administrative enforcement powers including
stiff civil money penalties. FDICIA cemented the use of capital requirements in bank regulation, using capital
adequacy as a springboard for an increasingly formal system of regulation.
50. Section 101 of GLB repeals Section 20 of Glass-Steagall. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (2000). Section 20 of Glass-
Steagall prohibited member banks (i.e., national banks and state member banks) from affiliating with any firm
"engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution of securities." Jd. Section
101 of GLB also repeals Section 32 of Glass Steagall. 12 U.S.C. § 78 (2000). Section 32 of Glass Steagall
prohibited certain management interlocks between member banks and firms "primarily engaged in the issue,
flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution" of securities. Id. Significantly, GLB did not repeal Section 16
of Glass-Steagall, which prohibits national banks from engaging in most underwriting. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2000).
Section 21 of Glass-Steagall, which prohibits any firm "engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling,
or distributing" securities from also engaging in the deposit-taking business, also remains on the books. 12 U.S.C.
§ 378 (2000).
5 I. See Michele Heller, DC Speaks: Gramm Calls GLB His Legacy; Gradual Impact Was 'Anticipated,' AM.
BANKER, Nov. 9, 2001, at 1.
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Community Reinvestment Act sunshine requirements, and consumer protection in
insurance sales. GLB's privacy provisions will likely have greater practical as well as
symbolic impact on the banking industry than the deregulatory portions of GLB.
Driven by fast developing internet technology and allegations of misuse of consumer
information against U.S. Bancorp, Congress passed the first federal law that seeks to
protect personal financial information. 52 Title V of GLB provides: "It is the policy of the
Congress that each financial institution has an affirmative and continuing obligation to
respect the privacy of its customers and to protect the security and confidentiality of those
customers' nonpublic personal information. 53 The practical implications of the privacy
provisions are yet to be seen. A recent General Accounting Office report concluded: "It is
too soon to assess the efficacy and adequacy of the remedies provided for under [the GLB
privacy provisions]. 54
Apart from their specific impact and application, GLB's privacy provisions represent
an important trend toward consumer protection in federal banking law. In sharp contrast to
the SEC and FTC, federal bank regulators' traditional role was not consumer protection.
Since the late 1960s, however, Congress has passed more and more legislation that imposes
a consumer protection mandate on the bank regulators. Examples include: the Truth in
Lending Act,55 Truth in Savings Act,56 Home Equity Loan Consumer Protection Act of
1988, 57 Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act,5 8 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,59 and
Expedited Funds Availability Act of 1987.60 GLB continues that trend by creating new
consumer protection provisions and placing their enforcement, at least in part, in the
hands of the bank regulators.
C. GLB's Approach to Regulatory Modernization Emphasizes Functional Regulation
GLB addresses the question of regulatory modernization through its apparent
endorsement of functional regulation. The conference report explains:
Both House and Senate bills generally adhere to the principle of functional
regulation, which holds that similar activities should be regulated by the same
regulator. Different regulators have expertise at supervising different activities.
52. That is not to say that prior to GLB there were no federal statutes that addressed financial privacy. For
example, The Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (2000), restricts government access to
financial information. There were, however, no broad-based federal standards of the magnitude provided in GLB.
Still, the GLB privacy provisions are relatively narrow when compared, for example, to the European Union's
Directive on Data Protection. Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31. "By its terms, the [Directive]
applies to all processing of personal data by any person or organization whose activities are governed by EU law
and, thus, provides comprehensive privacy standards for both private and governmental databases." L. Richard
Fischer, Emerging Issues in the World of Financial Privacy, in FINANCIAL SERVICES MODERNIZATION 249 (ALI-
ABA Course of Study, Feb. 3, 2000), available at WESTLAW, SEA I ALI-ABA 241. In contrast, the GLB privacy
provisions apply only to financial institutions.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a).
54. Financial Privacy: Too Soon to Assess the Privacy Provisions in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999,
U.S. Gen. Accounting Office Rept., GAO-01-617 (May 2001).
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65, 1671-77 (1998).
56. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301-13 (2000).
57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1637a, 1665b, 1647 (1998).
58. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-81t (1998).
59. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-92o (1998).
60. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-10 (2000).
61. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing the regulatory aspects of GLB).
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It is inefficient and impractical to expect a regulator to have or develop expertise
in regulating all aspects of financial services. Accordingly, the legislation
intends to ensure that banking activities are regulated by bank regulators,
securities activities are regulated by securities regulators, and insurance
activities are regulated by insurance regulators.62
Functional regulation as a means of dividing regulatory responsibility enjoyed
virtually unanimous support among those advocating the bill. The support for this
regulatory approach in the United States is not terribly surprising. The adoption of
functional regulation in GLB meant essentially the maintenance of the status quo for the
existing regulators. For example, under GLB, banks lost their general exemption from the
definitions of "broker" and "dealer" under the federal securities laws, 63 and therefore must
register as brokers and dealers and submit to SEC regulation if they engage in securities
brokerage. However, prior to GLB, most banks engaged in securities brokerage activities
through an SEC-regulated subsidiary. Therefore, the practical effect of this seemingly
important statutory change is less clear.64
Despite the statute's affirmative statements otherwise, Congress did not create a
functional regulatory scheme with the passage of GLB. The approach under GLB is more
accurately described as a combination of functional and institutional regulation. 65  GLB
does not, for example, give the SEC the authority to regulate all sales of securities66 as
would be the case under a truly functional scheme. The effect of the statute is to give the
SEC the authority to regulate securities firms (including those that are affiliated with banks)
and the bank regulators the authority to regulate banks (no matter what types of products
they sell). 67 This sounds a lot like institutional regulation. What brought GLB closer to
functional regulation was the combination of two factors: (1) the repeal of the general
exception of banks from the definitions of "broker" and "dealer" under the federal
62. H.R. REP. No. 106-434, at 157 (1999).
63. Under GLB banks are no longer generally exempted from the definitions of broker and dealer. The new
definitions, however, still exclude significant bank securities business such as fiduciary activities. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(4) (2000) (new definition of broker); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (2000) (new definition of dealer). Conflict
arose last year when the SEC issued interim final rules to define the bank exemptions from the definitions of
"broker" and "dealer." See Definition of Terms in Specific Exemptions for Banks, Savings Associations, and
Savings Banks Under Sections 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-44291, 66 Fed. Reg. 27760 (interim final rule May 18, 2001); Kathleen Day, Regulators Battle Over
Banks: Three Agencies Say SEC Rules Overstep Securities-Trading Law, WASH. POST, July 3, 2001, at E3
(highlighting bank regulators' objection to the SEC rules regarding the trustee and custodian exceptions). The
SEC retreated from the position taken in the interim final rules and issued an order extending the date for
compliance until May 12, 2002, indicating that the interim rules would be amended. Order Extending Temporary
Exemption of Banks, Savings Associations, and Savings Banks from Definitions of "Broker" and "Dealer" Under
Section 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-44570 (July 18,
2001), 2001 SEC LEXIS 1407.
64. The practical effect will be determined in large part by the parameters of the SEC's future rulemaking with
regard to the banks' exemptions from the definitions of "broker" and "dealer." See supra note 63 and authorities
cited therein.
65. Institutional regulation divides authority by institution type as opposed to activity or product.
66. For example, the bank regulators (not the SEC) are still responsible for enforcing the securities laws
relating to the sale of government securities by a bank. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-5(a)(I)(B) (2000); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(34)(G) (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 78o-5(g)(2) (2000). In addition, the definitions of broker and dealer still
exclude significant bank securities business, thus allowing banks to engage in such business without SEC
oversight. See supra note 63. The SEC, however, continues to regulate banks when they sell municipal securities.
15 U.S.C. § 78o-4 (2000).
67. See supra note 63 (discussing the regulation of banks' municipal securities activities).
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securities laws 68 and (2) the institutional restrictions that require new activities to be housed
outside of the bank.69
GLB diverges further from a pure functional regulation model by giving the Fed
umbrella regulatory authority over financial holding companies. At the same time, the
Fed's umbrella authority is clearly diminished by Congress's attempt to rest most power in
the hands of the functional regulators. GLB grants the Fed the authority to require reports
from holding company subsidiaries, but the Fed is admonished to rely on the reports made
to the functional regulators first. 70  GLB gives the Fed the authority to examine bank
holding company subsidiaries, but the Fed may only make examinations of functionally
regulated subsidiaries, such as securities and insurance subs, in certain circumstances.
These circumstances include: if the Fed has reasonable cause to believe that the activities of
the subsidiary pose a material risk to an affiliated depository institution or that examination
is necessary to inform the Fed of the subsidiary's systems for monitoring safety and
soundness risk; or if the Fed has reason to believe that the subsidiary is not in compliance
with GLB or any other law administered by the Fed.71 Finally, the Fed lacks authority to
impose capital requirements on securities and insurance subsidiaries that meet the capital
requirements of their own federal and state regulators.
72
The Fed's regulatory objectives as umbrella supervisor of financial holding
companies do not differ from those traditionally applied to the Fed's supervision of bank
holding companies: "The Federal Reserve, as umbrella supervisor, will seek to determine
that FHCs are operated in a safe and sound manner so that their financial condition does not
threaten the viability of affiliated depository institutions." 73  While the safety and
soundness goal is consistent with the Fed's traditional role, the assumption is that financial
holding companies will be more diversified in their financial activities, and thus represent a
greater regulatory challenge than the traditional bank holding company. For that reason,
the Fed's role as umbrella supervisor under GLB can be seen as providing the Fed with an
expanded role in financial institution supervision.
IV. THE UNITED KINGDOM'S FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS ACT: A
CONFLUENCE OF SEVERAL THEMES
A. Background-Regulatory Modernization, Not Financial Modernization
FSMA reorders radically the United Kingdom's regulatory regime. The Act's main
feature is its overhaul and unification of the oversight of banking, insurance, and other
investment services by establishing the Financial Services Authority as a powerful and
nearly universal regulator of the United Kingdom's financial services industry.74 It
68. See supra note 63.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 40-4 1.
70. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(1) (2000).
71. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(2) (2000).
72. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(3) (2000).
73. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation,
Supervisory Letter to the Officer in Charge of Supervision and Appropriate Supervisory Staff at Each Federal
Reserve Bank and to Financial Holding Companies Regarding the Framework for Financial Holding Company
Supervision, SR 00-13 (SUP) (Aug. 15, 2000), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
SRLETTERS/2000/SR0013.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2003).
74. The solvency of occupational pension schemes remains separately regulated by the Occupational Pensions
Regulatory Authority established by the Pensions Act 1993.
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replaces most of the pre-existing financial services legislation, including the Financial
Services Act 1986,75 the Banking Act 1987,76 and the Building Societies Act 1986.77
FSMA regulates a wide range of activities including deposit taking, the safekeeping and
administration of assets, dealing in investments, arranging deals in investments, managing
investments, and providing investment advice. 71 It establishes a single authorization regime
for all regulated activities, and envisages the eventual development of a single rulebook for
all types of financial service business. Finally, the FSMA also introduces radical new
sanctions to restrain the abuse of financial markets. 79 Despite its considerable length (433
sections and 21 schedules), 80 it is nonetheless best thought of as a framework act, leaving
many of the details to be supplied by secondary (delegated) legislation.
FSMA was enacted in a context very different from GLB. For the best part of a
decade and a half prior to the Act, Britain had witnessed the gradual dismantling of its
largely informal system of segmenting financial services. First among the structural
changes was the Stock Exchange's "Big Bang," under which the Exchange agreed to
abolish minimum commissions, to put an end to single capacity8 l (thus allowing the
development of broker-dealers), and to permit outside firms to take over member firms.
Previously, Stock Exchange members were restricted to adopting the partnership form, and
outside firms had been limited to a thirty-percent shareholding. One result of these
changes, which took effect in 1986, was thus to permit other types of financial
intermediaries to acquire an interest in Stock Exchange member firms.
Legislative changes also took effect at approximately the same time. Most notably,
the Building Societies Act 198682 introduced a significant measure of deregulation into this
previously highly regulated sector. This move permitted the societies to compete with joint
stock banks in retail financial products, including checking accounts. The privatization of
the Trustee Savings Bank in 1988 also added an extra dimension to competition in high
street banking.
Overarching these developments was the growing influence of EC law on the pattern
of U.K. financial regulation. As part of the regulatory harmonization required to complete
the European Internal Market in financial services, a series of directives relating to specific
aspects of regulatory policy were enacted. A number of these were based on the concept of
a "credit institution," which embraced both banks and building societies, thus laying a
common platform for their prudential regulation. Moreover, the banking directives were
premised on the continental European model of a universal bank. Thus, the Capital
Adequacy Directive, 3 which set capital requirements for market risk for both banks and
investment firms, raised the issue of how competitive equality between banks and securities
75. Financial Services Act, 1986, c. 60 (Eng.).
76. Banking Act, 1987, c. 22 (Eng.).
77. Building Societies Act, 1986, c. 53 (Eng.).
78. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, sched. 2, pt. I (Eng.), available at
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/20000008.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2003).
79. See generally George Walker, Penalties for Market Abuse, in BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO THE FINANCIAL
SERVICES & MARKETS ACT 2000 (Michael Blair ed., 2001).
80. In contrast, GLB has 142 sections-quite terse by American standards.
81. Previously, Stock Exchange rules had required member firms to operate either as brokers or as "jobbers"
(i.e., market makers).
82. Building Societies are mutual credit institutions, specializing in housing finance and consumer credit. In
this respect they are similar to S&L institutions in the United States, but represent a much more significant part of
the British financial system. Many have now converted into joint stock companies, after having attained a scale
that put them among Britain's leading deposit-taking institutions. Building Societies Act, 1986, c. 53 (Eng.).
83. Council Directive 93/6 on the Capital Adequacy of Investment Firms and Credit Institutions, 1993 O.J. (L
141) 1.
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firms could be preserved if the same directive was implemented by different sets of
regulators.
As a result of the process of dismantling informal structural regulation, the late 1980s
witnessed rapid industry evolution. The largest U.K. commercial banks acquired
investment banking arms, and linkages between banks and insurance companies began to
form. Financial conglomerates, straddling the banking, securities, and insurance sectors,
began to emerge. One consequence of these developments was that the pace of structural
change in the industry rapidly began to outpace the regulatory structure that had only just
been put in place. For example, financial conglomerate groups found themselves subject to
a plethora of different regulatory bodies, which both increased their regulatory burden and
impeded the ability of any one regulator to obtain an overview of their risk profile.
The rapid evolution of the structure of firms and the industry gave rise to a short but
intense policy debate in the eighteen months prior to the 1997 general election on the
appropriate policy response.84 One of the main issues debated was how to ensure effective
oversight of complex financial groups, and how to bring greater coherence to what was
widely perceived as being an unnecessarily fragmented regulatory system with its
associated problems of overlapping and underlapping jurisdictions. However, prior to the
election, the Labour policy handbook, New Labour, New Life for Britain,85 had been vague
about the new government's plans for financial regulation. It promised only to "reform and
strengthen the regulatory system" and "to simplify both the structure and the nature of the
system so that it commands the confidence of both the public and the industry."86 While
consistent with both these statements, the FSMA went much further than many observers
had expected in replacing nine existing regulators with a single agency, the FSA.
B. A Single Regulator
The FSA is unique among regulatory agencies in the industrialized world in terms of
the diversity of businesses regulated and its very broad scope, encompassing both
prudential and business conduct regulation. 7 While other integrated financial regulators
have been in existence for some years, most notably in the Scandinavian countries, none
has been established in a country with a financial sector as large as the United Kingdom's,
and all have a predominantly prudential focus.88 In addition, the FSMA establishes a
Financial Services Compensation Scheme, which unifies and replaces the separate schemes
for banks, building societies, insurance companies, and securities and investment firms
previously operated by the separate regulators. 89 Thus the counterpart of a single regulator
84. See TAYLOR, TWIN PEAKS, supra note 14; Reforming the City, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 15, 1997, at 19; see
also Speech by the Governor to the Edinburgh Finance and Investment Seminar and the Glasgow Discussion
Group on Finance and Investment, Some Thoughts on Financial Regulation (Feb. 28, 1996), in BANK ENG. Q.
BULL., 1996, at 213 (critiquing Michael Taylor's Twin Peaks proposal and defending the status quo).
85. LABOUR PARTY, NEW LABOUR, NEW LIFE FOR BRITAIN (1996), available at
http://web.archive.org/web/19961109041129/www.labour.org.uk/new-life/britain/index.html (last visited Mar. 20,
2003).
86. Id.
87. Prudential regulation is concerned with the financial soundness of regulated institutions, whereas business
conduct regulation is concerned with the way in which financial products are marketed and sold.
88. See MICHAEL TAYLOR & ALEX FLEMING, THE WORLD BANK, INTEGRATED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION:
LESSONS FROM NORTHERN EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE (Nov. 1999) (Policy Research Working Paper No. 2223),
available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servletlWDS_Ibank-servlet?pcont-details&eid =
000094946_9912020634345 (last visited Mar. 20, 2003).
89. FSMA, 2000, c. 8, pt. XV, §§ 212-34 (Eng.), available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/
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is a single compensation scheme, which does not distinguish between depositors, policy-
holders, and investors in the terms of its coverage.
The FSA has a somewhat unusual constitutional status as a body corporate with the
form of a company limited by guarantee. 90 It is not a Crown corporation (as is the Bank of
England) or an administrative agency attached to a government department. This vesting of
powers in a body corporate represents a departure from either of the main administrative
forms used for the regulation of other industries and in most other countries of the world,
which have tended either to take the form of vesting responsibility in a single official (e.g.,
the Comptroller of the Currency) or in a multimember commission (e.g., the Securities and
Exchange Commission). By contrast, the Act requires that the FSA's constitution provide
for a board of directors comprised of both executive and non-executive members and a
chairman, who are all members of the governing body.91 This arrangement, it has been
argued, provides a balance between the need for rapid decision making informed by special
expertise (provided by the chairman and executive members of the board) and the need for
maintaining an element of collegiality and a degree of independent oversight (provided by
the non-executive members). 92 A further advantage claimed for the board arrangement is
that it enhances the transparency and accountability of regulatory bodies. The FSA has a
clear line of accountability to the Treasury, which may both appoint and dismiss the
chairman and the board,93 and which is specifically empowered by the Act to commission
reports on the FSA's performance of its duties.94
C. The FSA's Objectives
Four statutory objectives define the FSA's overall purpose: maintaining market
confidence; promoting public awareness; protecting consumers; and reducing financial
crime.95 Each of the four statutory objectives illuminate an overarching theme of consumer
20000008.htm (last visited Mar. 20. 2003). The Financial Services Compensation scheme replaces the U.K.'s past
deposit insurance arrangements, which provided for coverage up to a maximum of ninety percent of the first
£20,000. Banking Act, 1987, c. 22 (Eng.) (as amended). It also replaced the separate schemes that were
established by the Financial Services Act of 1986 to pay compensation to customers of securities and investment
firms in the event of losses due to fraud or misrepresentation and the Policyholders' Protection Scheme which was
established by the Insurance Companies Act 1972 in order to meet the liabilities of insurance companies to their
policyholders in the event of a firm's insolvent liquidation. Financial Services Act, 1986, c. 60 (Eng.); Insurance
Companies Act, 1982, c. 50 (Eng.).
90. The Companies Act of 1985 permits the formation of a company limited by guarantee. The Companies
Act, 1985, c. 6 (Eng.). Instead of the liabilities of its members being limited by shares, the members agree that in
the event of a liquidation, they will, if required, subscribe an agreed amount. The member has no liability as long
as the company remains a going concern, and members are liable only to the extent of their guarantees. A division
of shares is inappropriate as no sharing of profits is contemplated. This form of company has been widely used by
charitable and quasi-charitable organizations, such as schools, colleges, and foundations, as an alternative to the
creation of a trust. PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER'S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 11 (6th ed. 1997).
91. FSMA, 2000, c. 8, sched. I, pt., I para. 2(2). The chairman, executive directors, and non-executive
directors are appointed by the Treasury and are subject to removal by the Treasury. Id. paras. 2(3), 3(2).
92. This is an explicit function of the non-executive members. Id. para. 4(3).
93. Id, para. 2(3).
94. Id. para. 10.
95. FSMA's emphasis on regulatory objectives makes it unusual compared to the Acts that it supersedes,
including the Banking Act 1987 and the Financial Services Act 1986. Rather than appearing prominently in the
first part of these Acts, the objectives of regulation were neither clearly articulated nor prominently displayed. It
was the government's intention in giving such prominence to the FSA's objectives that this would help to ensure
that regulation is effective and appropriate and that the FSA can be held accountable for the way in which its
functions are exercised. The FSMA applies these objectives, together with the associated principles of regulation,
directly to the FSA's specific activities, including rulemaking, the preparation and issuing of codes, and the
regulator's general policies.
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protection responsibility, the theme being most evident in relation to the explicit consumer
protection and consumer awareness objectives. Still, the other objectives relating to
financial crime and market confidence are also essentially oriented toward consumer
protection. The former overlaps with the responsibilities of several other enforcement
agencies, most notably the Serious Fraud Office. The latter overlaps with the Bank of
England's responsibility for ensuring the overall stability of the financial system. Each of
the objectives is discussed in greater detail below.
1. Consumer Protection and Awareness Regulation
The FSA's primary responsibility may be thought to be the protection of consumers
and users of financial services, both from fraudulent or exploitative sales practices and the
insolvency of the firm with which they have contracted. The need for enhanced protection
of consumers of financial services in Britain was the primary rationale for the enactment of
FSMA and the creation of the FSA. Although the radicalism of the government's
intentions had not been made clear prior to the 1997 general election, it was widely
understood that a new Labour government would undertake far-reaching changes to the
marketing and sales of retail financial products. Change was seen as necessary because of a
serious regulatory lapse that became known as the "pensions mis-selling scandal."
The "mis-selling" issue concerned the sales and marketing practices of personal
pensions. Personal pensions, provided through life insurance companies, were investment
vehicles introduced by the Conservative government in the mid-1980s and were intended to
be an alternative to occupational pensions for employees who either did not have access to
occupational pension schemes or who intended to change jobs with comparative frequency.
However, once introduced, they were sold on a large scale to individuals who already
enjoyed the benefit of occupational schemes and who had no intention of changing
employers. One of the largest groups to suffer from alleged mis-selling were public
employees, including teachers and health service workers. Although the actual numbers of
people who were the victims of genuine mis-selling remains the subject of some dispute, by
the early 1990s it had become clear that a significant minority of these public sector
workers-who are also a core Labour constituency-had been persuaded to opt out of their
occupational schemes and into private schemes. In only a very few cases would a private
pension have offered better returns than the occupational scheme, especially since the latter
also had the benefit of an employer's contribution. Hence workers who were persuaded to
switch to the private schemes were badly advised, and in at least some cases the mis-selling
seems to have been due to the fact that insurance company salesforces were poorly
controlled and were paid on a commission-only basis, thus leading to high pressure sales
tactics.
The Financial Services Act 1986 had been intended to provide protection to
individuals against the sale of unsuitable investment products.96 The responsibility for
regulating the sale of personal pensions fell to a number of Self-Regulating Organizations
(SROs) that failed to take early and sufficient enforcement action and that therefore failed
to prevent widespread mis-selling. With their close ties to the industry and their
practitioner-dominated boards, the SROs were believed to have been suffering from a
particularly serious form of regulatory capture. Although the Securities and Investments
96. Under its regulatory regime investment advisers were under an obligation to offer "best advice" and to
make full inquiry as to the "suitability" of a product for a clients' investment needs. Both concepts had been
introduced into the regulatory framework as a way of regarding the sale of complex, packaged financial products
like pensions.
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Board (SIB) was supposed to ensure that the SROs regulated in the public interest, in
practice it lacked sufficient enforcement powers to ensure appropriate regulatory action.
The SIB possessed only the power to "derecognise" an SRO, an option that was too
draconian to be an effective basis for intervention. 97
In response to these apparent failures, the Labour party committed itself to
establishing a powerful, independent regulatory authority for the sale of retail financial
products. The FSA's primary role-as evidenced by two of its four statutory objectives-
is to prevent a repeat of episodes of the pensions mis-selling. The objectives of "securing
the appropriate degree of protection for consumers" 98 and "promoting public understanding
of the financial system" 99 may be regarded as the basis for a regulatory system which
recognizes that the majority of users of financial services lack the knowledge, information,
and skills to make informed judgments regarding financial investments. Regulation exists
both to promote fairness in the sales process and to foster the skills necessary to make
informed choices. This regulatory philosophy departs significantly from the past regulation
in Britain and current regulation in the United States. Historically, regulation in Britain
was largely informed by the principle of "freedom-with-disclosure," which left the
producer and the consumer free to enter into transactions subject to the important proviso
that the consumer did so on the basis of full and accurate disclosure.'00 Although this
principle suffered dilution by certain features of the Financial Services Act 1986, it was
explicitly rejected during the drafting stages of the bill for FSMA. In determining the
appropriate degree of protection, the FSA is now obliged to take into account a consumer's
need for advice and accurate information.
The FSA's A New Regulator for the New Millennium'0 ' spells out its approach to
consumer protection. It distinguishes between a number of different risks, including what it
terms "prudential risk," "bad faith risk," "complexity/unsuitability risk," and "performance
risk."'0 2 The FSA argues that it has a role to play in reducing the first three of these risks,
but that regulation is not intended to guard against "performance risk," namely the risk
"that investments do not deliver the hoped-for returns. 10 3 Hence regulation can reasonably
be expected to protect the consumer against the risk of firm collapse; the risk of fraud;
misrepresentation or deliberate mis-selling; and the risk that consumers are sold a product
that is unsuitable for their needs. But the FSA's regulation is not intended to protect
against the risk of under-performance.
97. In contrast, the SEC possesses significant authority over the SROs. The Commission must approve any
new rules or rule changes proposed by the SROs. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (2000). The Commission has the power to
impose rules on the SROs. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (2000). Moreover, disciplinary actions taken by the SROs against
their members are subject to Commission review. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d), (e) (2000). The Commission also has the
authority to suspend or revoke an SRO's registration or to censure or impose limitations upon the SRO's activities.
15 U.S.C. § 78s(h) (2000). For an extensive analysis of the relationship between the SEC and the exchanges, see
David A. Lipton, The SEC or the Exchanges: Who Should Do What and When? A Proposal to Allocate Regulatory
Responsibilities for Securities Markets, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 527 (1983).
98. FSMA, 2000, c. 8, pt. 1, § 5(1) (Eng.), http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/20000008.htm (last visited
Mar. 20, 2003).
99. ld § 4(l).
100. Perhaps the best statement of the principle was by Justice Louis D. Brandeis in OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 103 (1914): "[l]t is now recognized in the simplest merchandising, that there
should be full disclosures .... The law has begun to require publicity in aid of fair dealing. The Federal Pure
Food Law does not guarantee quality or prices; but it helps the buyer to judge of quality by requiring disclosure of
ingredients. Among the most important facts to be learned for determining the real value of a security is the
amount of water it contains."
101. FIN. SERV. AUTH., A NEW REGULATOR FOR THE NEW MILLENIUM (2000), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/index-title-atoz.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2003) [hereinafter NEW MILLENNIUM].
102. ld. at 8.
103. Id
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Closely connected to the consumer protection objective is the second statutory
objective, which requires the FSA to promote "public understanding of the financial
system. ' 10 4 This is novel. None of the regulatory agencies that the FSA replaced was
explicitly charged with a consumer education role. The prominence of this objective in the
FSA's statutory responsibilities suggests that the government assigns it a very high priority.
The FSA has indicated that it will pursue two main aims under this objective.' 5 It will
endeavor to promote a higher level of general financial literacy, and it will aim to improve
the information and advice available to consumers. The second aim clearly involves
significant overlap with the consumer protection objective. Thus, the FSA proposes to
make greater use of league tables and relative performance indicators-methods that had
been under development by the previous regulatory bodies. However, the promotion of
financial literacy does involve a significant departure from previous practice, and the FSA
has stated that it interprets this aim as involving the provision of programs to consumers to
enable them to acquire the knowledge and skills that they need to become better informed
consumers. This undertaking will also involve the FSA in fostering public understanding
of retail financial products, with a particular focus on vulnerable or inexperienced
consumers.
2. Financial Crime
The fourth statutory objective is the "reduction of financial crime."' 0 6 This objective
seeks to "reduc[e] the extent to which it is possible for a business carried on by a regulated
person to be used for a purpose connected with financial crime."' 0 7 This objective covers a
number of functions of the FSA's predecessor agencies. These include the important
function of protecting consumers of financial services from fraud or dishonesty.'0 8 In
particular, money laundering raises growing regulatory concern. The prevention of money
laundering has important linkages with prudential issues, most notably the adequacy of a
firm's systems and controls. Moreover, the use of a financial firm for criminal purposes
may also damage public confidence in that institution and in the financial system as a
whole.'
0 9
Significantly, the concept of financial crime under the FSMA is expanded to include
"misconduct in, or misuse of information relating to, a financial market.'" o This provides
the statutory underpinning for market integrity regulation. This represents a major
extension of the FSA's powers compared to the agencies it replaced. For several years
prior to the FSMA, in speeches made by its then chairman, Sir Andrew Large, the SIB
pointed to serious shortcomings in the investigation and disposal of cases of insider dealing
and market abuse. In part, these shortcomings were due to fragmented jurisdictions. For
example, the SIB had no power over market abuse resulting from the conduct of individuals
who were not authorized persons under the Financial Services Act. In part they were due
to the fact that such cases could only be prosecuted under the criminal law, with a criminal
rather than a civil burden of proof.' In complex cases in which the evidence could only
104. FSMA, 2000, c. 8, pt. 1, § 4.
105. NEW MILLENIUM, supra note 101, at 7.
106. FSMA, 2000, c. 8, pt. 1, § 6.
107. Id. § 6(l).
108. Id.
109. In this sense, the fourth objective is connected to the financial system stability objective. See NEW
MILLENIUM, supra note 101, at 9.
110. FSMA, 2000, c. 8, pt. 1, § 6 (3)(b).
111. Consider the analysis of Sir Andrew Large:
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be interpreted by experts, the number of prosecutions brought for market abuse was very
small and convictions even smaller. The regulators spent several years pressing for a
revision to the law that would permit them to dispose of cases of market abuse through civil
rather than criminal channels. Significantly, this was one aspect of U.K. regulatory reform
in which its proponents seem to have drawn direct inspiration from U.S. law and
practice. 12
One of the main features of the FSMA, and also one of its most controversial, is its
introduction of just such a civil channel for disposal of cases of market abuse. Market
abuse is not decriminalized by the new legislation, but it provides for a parallel civil
disposal of such cases. The FSA will promulgate a Code of Market Conduct, breaches of
which will be subject to civil rather than criminal sanctions. Where market abuse is
established, the FSA is empowered to impose unlimited civil fines and
restitution/disgorgement orders on application to the High Court. In addition, the FSA will
also be authorized to bring criminal prosecutions under the existing criminal law for
conduct that constitutes market abuse. Its jurisdiction will therefore overlap with the
Serious Fraud Office, and much of the conduct covered by its code of practice on market
abuse also falls within the scope of the rules of the exchanges. Hence, the historical gaps in
the regulators' ability to dispose of abuse cases have been replaced by expanded powers
and significant overlap of agency enforcement authority.
3. The Stability of the Financial System
The FSA's most important operational responsibilities in the future will be the
consumer protection charge it has acquired from the merger of the SROs with its
predecessor organization the SIB. In addition, the FSA will have a powerful role in dealing
with financial crime that will take it a considerable distance from concerns for the stability
of the financial system. Nonetheless, although systemic risk is not explicitly mentioned,
the FSA retains a systemic protection mandate.' 13 This mandate arises under the first of its
statutory objectives relating to "market confidence." This term is defined in FSMA as
"maintaining confidence in the financial system," ' 14 including financial markets and
exchanges, connected activities, and regulated activities. The term "confidence" is
generally used in the context of the regulation of securities markets, where the purpose of
regulation is to provide investors and potential investors with confidence in the integrity
[U]nder the criminal system the evidential and public interest hurdles to be cleared before
commencing a successful prosecution in the criminal courts are, quite correctly, high. But, as a result,
activities which take place outside the scope of the regulators, whether the actions of company
directors or end users of markets, may finish up not being taken to court. And since there is no
sufficient civil alternative, what we would deem unacceptable actions from a regulatory viewpoint,
and which we could often deal with if entered into by someone who was subject to regulation, can
currently go unchallenged.
Sir Andrew Large, Speech on Standards of Market Integrity in the New World (Oct. 26, 1996), in Michael Taylor,
Financial Services and Markets Act: The Policy Background-lI, 31 Amicus Curiae 47 (2000), available at
http://www.ials.sas.ac.uk/publish/amicus/docs/amicus3 lt.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2003).
112. Large observed: "People often remark that what we need in this country is a US-style Securities and
Exchange Commission .... [W]here [they] have a point is when they say the SEC is an impressive enforcement
body. And why? Because I think of the breadth and nature of its civil powers." Id.
113. A proposal to incorporate the systemic protection mandate explicitly in the objectives was made by a
Joint Committee of the two houses of Parliament set up to scrutinize the draft Bill for FSMA. Although made by a
committee comprising many knowledgeable experts, it was rejected by the government.
114. FSMA, 2000, c. 8, pt. I, § 3(l) (Eng.), available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/
20000008.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2003).
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and orderly conduct of the market. However, the objective as formulated in the Act goes
beyond this relatively limited conventional sense. The objective refers to confidence "in
the financial system," which indicates a comparatively extended meaning. An important
element in this extended meaning relates to the stability of the financial system, which the
Treasury and the FSA have made clear that they regard as being integral to the market
confidence objective. The FSA explains that maintaining confidence
"involves ... preserving both actual stability in the financial system and the reasonable
expectation that it will remain stable."'
1 5
Central banks have traditionally taken overall responsibility for maintaining the
stability of the financial system. This is because the greatest systemic risk arises in the core
of the payments system. However, other elements of the financial system infrastructure,
including settlements and clearing systems, also contain the potential to act as a
transmission mechanism for contagion between financial institutions. For this reason,
although central banks have concerned themselves with the health of the banking system,
they have at times of extreme financial distress also extended their concern to other
elements of the financial system, including clearing houses and settlement systems.116
While ensuring the overall stability of the banking system is widely accepted to be a
core function of central banks, 117 more controversy has attached to their appropriate role in
the prudential regulation of individual banks. The argument for assigning the central bank
a direct role in banking supervision stresses the synergies between the conduct of monetary
policy and banking supervision. In particular, since banks are the conduit by which
changes in short-term interest rates are transmitted to the wider economy, the central bank
is vested in banks' financial soundness as a precondition for an effective monetary policy.
Moreover, this model suggests that a central bank needs access to information regarding the
soundness of banks for monetary policy purposes and for the exercise of its lender of last
resort function. For these reasons, the Bank of England argued strongly in favor of its
retention of a role in banking supervision. 118 The Bank could also point to the fact that
there were relatively few examples of central banks ever having formally lost the
responsibility for banking supervision, although in a number of cases central banks had
avoided taking on this responsibility in the first place. 19
However, the financial modernization debate introduced a new factor to be considered
in determining the appropriate role for the central bank in banking supervision. In essence,
the traditional case for central bank involvement in banking supervision has rested on the
proposition that banks' asset and liability structures render them a "special" type of
115. NEW MILLENIUM, supra note 101, at 5.
116. See generally CHARLES ALBERT ERIC GOODHART, THE EVOLUTION OF CENTRAL BANKS 29-46 (1988)
(discussing the role of an independent central bank in alleviating detrimental conflicts of interests that can occur in
the clearinghouse system when overseen by a commercial central bank).
117. Id. at4-5.
118. For an account of the formulation of the Banking Act 1979, see Schooner & Taylor, supra note 5, at
629-32. The Bank of England continued to insist on this view almost until the moment it lost the responsibility for
banking supervision. See, e.g., E.A. George, Are Banks Still Special?, Remarks at the IMF 7th Central Banking
Seminar (Jan. 29, 1997), available at http://www.bis.org/review/r970214c.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2003). The
Bank of England had been statutorily responsible for the supervision of deposit-taking institutions only since the
Banking Act 1979, but had practiced a non-statute-based form of supervision over what it regarded as the "core"
banking system for a long time prior to this. Schooner & Taylor, supra note 5, at 629.
119. Chief among these examples was Germany's Bundesbank, which has stressed the risks to a central bank's
involvement in bank supervision. First, a central bank that is also responsible for supervision may err on the side
of laxity if it fears that tight monetary conditions may lead to bank failures. Second, bank failures inevitably will
occur and when they do they will be blamed on the supervisor. If the supervisor is the central bank, its credibility
will be undermined, and with it, its credibility in the conduct of monetary policy.
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financial institution. By contrast, proponents of regulatory modernization argue that the
specialness of banks can be overstated, especially as the boundaries between banks and
other types of financial institutions become blurred. Hence the premise that it is possible to
draw a clear line around a specific sub-group of financial institutions of exclusive concern
to the central bank is becoming harder to sustain.. Institutions with which the central bank
has never previously enjoyed a close relationship are increasingly taking on bank-type risk
characteristics. However, to place all of these institutions under the central bank's direct
supervision might be perceived as a dangerous extension of the government safety net.
Moreover, the central bank often lacks the skills to appraise properly the risks associated
with these types of institutions. For these reasons, a number of regulatory modernization
proposals had recommended the creation of a single prudential regulator for all financial
institutions outside the central bank.12
0
In reality, these largely theoretical considerations were probably much less decisive in
the British case than the widespread perception that the Bank of England's performance as
a banking regulator had been undistinguished. Although Britain has avoided the type of
serious banking crisis that has afflicted both developed and developing countries in recent
years, the Bank of England's handling of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International
(BCCI) closure and its supervision of Barings merchant bank prior to Barings's spectacular
collapse in 1995 were widely criticized in both the press and Parliament.' 21 The Bank's
widely criticized performance may have reinforced the skepticism over its suitability as a
bank regulator. 122
Whatever the ultimate motivation for the decision to remove the Bank of England's
responsibilities for banking supervision, the system created by FSMA has resulted in a
fundamentally different approach than that adopted by GLB. Whereas the latter has
resulted in an expansion of the Federal Reserve's regulatory role, the intention behind
FSMA has been to remove the central bank from any direct regulatory responsibilities.
Under FSMA, the FSA is clearly established as the institution responsible for the regulation
of individual banks. The Bank of England's regulatory responsibilities for deposit-taking
institutions had already been transferred to the Securities and Investments Board by virtue
of provisions of the Bank of England Act 1998.23
While the central bank may have retreated from the direct regulation of individual
banks, its responsibility for the overall stability of the banking and financial system is
acknowledged in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Bank, the FSA,
and the Treasury. The MoU divides responsibility for systemic stability between the Bank
and the FSA on the following lines: The Bank is responsible for "the overall stability of the
120. The Australian Wallis Inquiry cited these factors as grounds for its recommendation that the Reserve
Bank of Australia lose its responsibility for banking supervision. See Australian Treasury, The Financial System:
Towards 2010, Overview (1997), available at http://www.fsi.treasury.gov.au/content/FinalReport.asp (last visited
Mar. 20, 2003).
121. Among the most influential criticisms of the Bank of England's performance were those made by the
cross-party House of Commons Treasury Select Committee, especially in its reports on the BCCI and Barings
episodes. For more extensive discussion, see Schooner & Taylor, supra note 5, at 636-37.
122. Skepticism from Labour was not new. The 1974-79 Labour government had legislated to enact Britain's
first statute regulating banks since 1844. In 1977, when the legislation was being prepared, the then Prime
Minister, James Callaghan, apparently questioned whether the Bank of England was the right body to regulate
banks. Serious consideration was given to creating a new banking commission, although ultimately the views of
the Bank's Governor (Lord) Gordon Richardson prevailed over the skeptics and the task was handed to the Bank.
See id. at 630.
123. The SIB changed its name by special resolution to the Financial Services Authority in October 1997.
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financial system as a whole"1 24 which involves, inter alia, the financial system
infrastructure (in particular the payments system) and the "broad overview" of the
system.125 By contrast, the FSA's responsibilities are primarily institution specific, relating
to individual firms, markets, and clearing and settlement systems. 26 However, within this
broad distinction, the Bank is also permitted to undertake official financing operations in
"exceptional circumstances" and with the objective of "limit[ing] the risk of problems in or
affecting particular institutions spreading to other parts of the financial system."',
27
The practical application of the distinction between system-wide and institution-
specific responsibilities remains to be seen. The test of such an arrangement is how it will
handle the failure of an individual firm that is sufficiently large, potentially to pose a threat
to the stability of the wider financial system. Paragraph 11 of the MoU requires the Bank
and the FSA "immediately to inform and consult each other" in the event that either should
become aware of a potentially systemic problem. 128 While Paragraph 12 envisages the
appointment of a "lead institution" to manage the situation and to coordinate the
authorities' response in the event that a problem develops, there is no presumption that the
"lead institution" should be the Bank. In fact, Paragraph 3(iii)(b) of the MoU appears to
envisage that in at least some cases the FSA will take on a crisis resolution role, as it relates
to an individual institution, and may assume the role of attempting to broker a private sector
solution-something that has previously been the exclusive preserve of the central bank.
In theory, the relationship between the Bank and the FSA with regard to crisis
management remains ambiguous. Difficulty in defining the roles of the FSA and the Bank
are inevitable given the fact that it is rarely obvious that a problem arising at one institution
is confined to that institution. In reality, it may be relatively easy to determine whether the
problems in an individual institution are sufficiently serious to give rise to systemic
problems and hence to decide on the allocation of crisis management roles. Nonetheless,
the respective roles of the Bank and the FSA will not become entirely clear until the crisis
management arrangements are tested in practice.
Beyond the crisis management role, the Bank of England continues to have an
extensive role in supervisory and regulatory policy. A Financial Stability Wing of the
Bank, comprising over 150 staff,129 continues to engage in a diverse range of activities
relating to financial stability and the regulation of the financial system. As described in the
Bank's annual report, this work includes involvement in policy initiatives regarding bank
capital and liquidity (including initiatives conducted under the auspices of the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision in which the Bank retains its membership in addition to
the FSA) and identifying potential threats to international financial stability. Thus,
although the Bank lost its formal statutory role with respect to direct banking supervision,
its continued involvement in bank regulatory issues was inevitable.
124. Memorandum of Understanding Between HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the Financial Services
Authority, para. 2, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/mou.htm (last visited Mar. 20,
2003).
125. Id. para. 2(iii).
126. Id. para. 3.
127. Id. para. 2.
128. Jd. para. 11.
129. 2001 BANK OF ENGLAND ANNUAL REPORT 10, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk (last visited
Mar. 20, 2003).
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V. REGULATORY MODERNIZATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
GLB and FSMA offer very different approaches to the regulatory modernization
debate. While in places the accent of the two pieces of legislation is the same-in
particular, both emphasize consumer protection-their solution to regulatory modernization
is sharply at odds. GLB continues to assign an important direct regulatory role to the
central bank, and indeed has enhanced that role. By contrast, FSMA removes the
responsibility for banking supervision from the central bank and assigns the responsibility
to a single unitary regulator of all types of financial intermediaries. The clear expectation is
that a single regulatory authority will be able to deliver more effective and efficient
regulation of diversified financial groups.
The regulatory modernization differences between GLB and FSMA may be explained
in part by noting the different starting points of the two countries on the issue of financial
modernization. Financial modernization is much further advanced in the United Kingdom
than in the United States. The regulatory modernization differences can also be explained
through observation of the different status and prestige of their respective central banks.
Unlike the climate in Britain, the passage of GLB followed no crises130 or blame. The
existing regulators enjoy generally a positive reputation and the banking, and S&L crises of
the late 1980s and early 1990s had been addressed by earlier legislation. Nonetheless, GLB
appears to be even more exceptional in its failure to address the need for regulatory
modernization when it is placed in a broader comparative perspective. Recent reforms in
Australia, Germany, Japan, and other OECD countries suggest that a clear trend exists
toward the formation of unified regulatory authorities, often as a direct response to the
emergence of a financial services sector in which the traditional industry/product categories
are becoming increasingly irrelevant. By leaving the broad outlines of the U.S. regulatory
system unchanged, and assigning responsibility to the Fed as the "umbrella" regulator of
international groups, GLB bucks a prominent international trend.
Regulatory reform in Australia began before the United Kingdom's decision to create
the FSA. In 1996 the Australian government appointed a Financial System Inquiry under
the chairmanship of Stan Wallis, a leading businessman, to consider the implications for the
regulatory system of changes, both actual and prospective, in the financial system. The
final report of this Inquiry represents the most detailed examination to date of the case for
regulatory-as opposed to financial-modernization. 31 The Inquiry stressed the impact of
various deregulatory measures already taken in Australia as well as the effect of
technological forces that were quite independent of policy decisions. Projecting forward on
the basis of current trends, the Wallis Inquiry concluded that the future financial system
would display a number of features, including:
The erosion of traditional financial institutions through advances in information
technology, resulting in a financial system containing more niche and specialist
institutions.
130. The only conditions close to crisis surrounded GLB's privacy provisions, not the prudential aspects of
the bill. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
131. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 14. The Inquiry was appointed by the Australian Treasurer (finance
minister) in May 1996 with three terms of reference: (1) a stocktake of the results of financial deregulation since
the early 1980s; (2) an analysis of forces driving further change in the financial system; and (3) recommendations
for changes to regulatory arrangements, in particular to promote a more efficient and cost-effective financial
system, consistent with stability, prudence, integrity, and fairness. The Final Report was published by the
Australian government on March 9, 1997.
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The continued evolution of large financial conglomerates that develop brand
strengths to provide a range of financial services; indeed, the industry might
become polarized between very small and large financial institutions.
The development of many new payment instruments and payment service
providers may emerge, some divorced from traditional deposit products and
many using new delivery channels.
The shift of a much larger share of financial wealth into market claims rather
than deposits, which will continue to fall as a share of financial sector assets.,
3 2
Based on this analysis, the Wallis Inquiry concluded that a regulatory system
segmented along the traditional banking, securities, and insurance lines was no longer
optimal, and would come under increasing strain as market innovation matured. The
Inquiry, however, did not favor the creation of a single financial services regulator on the
model that would later be adopted for Britain's FSA.13 3 Instead, the Wallis Inquiry favored
a regulatory structure that reflected the objectives of regulation, i.e., the type of market
failure it was intended to correct.' 34  This gave rise to the creation of two regulatory
agencies. One agency would provide federal regulation of corporations, financial market
'integrity, and consumer protection. The other regulatory agency would be responsible for
the prudential regulation of all institutions licensed to conduct the general business of
deposit taking or offering capital-backed life products, general insurance products, or
pension investments.
The first agency, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC),'35 is
the statutory body with the power to administer the various conduct and disclosure laws
that apply in Australia. The intention was to permit the formulation of consistent and
comparable disclosure requirements across a range of products, including deposit accounts,
payment instruments, securities, collective investments, pensions, and insurance products.
The separate regulation of securities and futures contracts has been replaced by a broad
definition of "financial products," with the ASIC able to declare financial products as being
either covered by or exempt from the law.
The second agency, the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA), 136 is
responsible exclusively for ensuring the financial soundness of both bank and non-bank
financial intermediaries, with the exception of securities firms which are regulated by the
ASIC. It shares with the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 13 7 responsibility for ensuring
the integrity of the payments system, a function that is discharged by a subsidiary board of
the RBA, the Payments System Board. Other areas requiring coordination between the
132. Id.
133. The Wallis Inquiry issued its report before the British government had made an announcement about the
future of U.K. regulation. The extent to which the Wallis Inquiry may have influenced British official thinking is
unclear, although there are many points of similarity between the Wallis analysis and Chancellor Brown's
statement to the House of Commons. On the other hand, the decision by the British government to remove
banking supervision from the Bank of England was taken before the Australian government had made an official
response to the Wallis Inquiry report. It is possible that the British government's decision may have undermined
the Reserve Bank of Australia's position that it should not lose responsibility for banking supervision, as proposed
by the Wallis Inquiry. Thus, the relationship between the British and Australian decisions appears to have been
one of dialectical complexity.
134. See Jeffrey Carmichael, Financial Sector Reform and Prudential Regulation in Australia, Speech
delivered at the China-Australia Economic and Financial Market Development Symposium 2000 (Sept. 1, 2000),
at http://www.apra.gov.au/speeches/00_05.cfm (last visited Mar. 20, 2003).
135. See generally the ASIC website at http://www.asc.gov.au./asic/asic.nsf (last visited Mar. 20, 2003).
136. See generally the APRA website at http://www.apra.gov.au (last visited Mar. 20, 2003).
137. See generally the RBA website at http://www.rba.gov.au (last visited Mar. 20, 2003).
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RBA, APRA, and ASIC are dealt with under the auspices of the Council of Financial
Regulators.
Although the structure proposed by the Wallis Inquiry, and subsequently implemented
by the Australian government, is different in a number of important respects from the fully
integrated regulatory agency created in the United Kingdom, the underlying analysis of
these two reform efforts is remarkably similar in a number of important respects. Both
responded to the issues created by the increasing overlap between the banking, securities,
and insurance sectors. They represented an attempt to deal with the problems of regulatory
jurisdiction presented not only by the formation of financial conglomerate groups, but also
by the emergence of new types of financial instruments and the unbundling and rebundling
of different types of products previously offered by different types of firms. In these
respects the U.K. and Australian reforms represent genuine attempts to assess at least some
of the regulatory implications of the new financial landscape. 1
38
On January 25, 2001, the Finance Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany
followed the Australian and British lead by announcing far-reaching reforms to its
regulatory system with the creation of a single financial regulatory authority for its banking,
securities, and insurance sectors. The new German Financial Supervisory Authority,
Bundesanstalt fur Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BAFin), will replace three existing
agencies, the Federal Banking Supervisory Office (BAKred), which is responsible for the
prudential regulation of banks and securities firms; the securities market regulator (BAWe),
which is responsible for investor protection and for market transparency; and the insurance
regulator (BAV), which is responsible for the prudential regulation of insurance companies.
The justification given for the creation of the new agency was remarkably similar to the
arguments advanced in Australia and Britain. The aspiration is that the new agency will be
better equipped to deal with cross-sector issues like e-commerce, asset management,
derivatives, insider trading, and consumer and investor protection.139 Consistency of
supervision between the different parts of the financial sector, in a response to an
increasingly integrated financial market, is also a goal. In Germany, banks, securities
houses, and insurance companies compete for the same clients and offer similar or identical
financial products and marketing channels. While banks have traditionally been the major
players in the securities markets, recent deregulation of these markets has presented new
issues of market transparency and investor protection. In addition, linkages between banks
and insurance companies have become recently more prevalent, and with these linkages
full-service financial conglomerate groups have begun to emerge.
One important difference between the German and the Australian and British reforms,
however, was that Germany's reforms did not involve a significant diminution of the
138. Not only does the United States have separate regulators for each of the traditional financial industry
groups, but the United States has four federal regulators for banking institutions alone: Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Reserve
Board. In the Fall of 1993, the Clinton Administration proposed the creation of a federal banking commission that
would regulate all FDIC-insured depository institutions and their holding companies. See 1649 Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) 189,593 (Dec. 3, 1993). The Clinton Administration's proposal would have created a new Federal
Banking Commission. Subsequently, however, the Clinton Administration officials recommended delaying action
on agency consolidation pending Congress's resolution of financial modernization legislation. Heidi Mandanis
Schooner, Recent Challenges to the Persistent Dual Banking System, 41 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 263, 271 n.47
(1996).
139. See generally the website of the Finance Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany, at
http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de (last visited Mar. 20, 2003). See also Bundesanstalt fmr
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BAFin), the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, at http://www.bafin.de/
index e.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2003).
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Bundesbank's regulatory role since it had never had direct responsibility for banking
supervision. 1
40
A number of other OECD countries have now adopted unified supervision. Japan has
created a Financial Services Agency comprising the former bureau of the Ministry of
Finance responsible for banking and insurance supervision and the regulation of securities
markets.'14  A quasi-autonomous agency, the Securities Exchange Surveillance
Commission, was also transferred to the new organization. The Japanese FSA is unusual in
that it reports to the Prime Minister's office rather than to the Ministry of Finance; this
arrangement was the result of the authorities' desire to remove the potential conflicts of
interest inherent in the Ministry's role as both the regulator and the promoter of the
financial services sector. 14 2  However, the Ministry of Finance continues to exercise
responsibility for financial policy planning and legislation. The FSA exercises its
supervisory powers jointly with a number of other institutions including the Bank of Japan,
which continues to conduct its own examinations of banks, the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (non-bank financial institutions), and the Ministry of Agriculture (for
agriculture-related financial institutions). Credit cooperatives continue to be regulated by
local governments. 
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In December 1997, Korea also established a Financial Supervisory Commission that
consolidated all financial sector supervision for commercial banks, merchant banks,
securities firms, insurance companies, and other non-bank financial institutions. 144 It was
established in part to enhance the independence of supervision in the aftermath of the Asian
crisis and in part to eliminate a number of gaps in regulation that had given rise to
unsupervised financial intermediaries whose activities had contributed to the crisis. 14 5 A
number of countries with comparatively small financial sectors, including Estonia, Iceland,
Ireland, and Lithuania have also recently embarked on the unification of their financial
sector supervision. In these cases, however, the motivation for unification may have been
primarily to obtain economies of scale in supervision.
The GLB's approach to regulatory modernization takes exception from not only the
U.K. approach, but also from an emerging international trend towards unified financial
sector supervision outside the central bank. GLB's adherence to functional regulation is
not surprising given its preservation of the status quo, but that approach is troubling to the
extent that the bill incorporates safety and soundness regulation. Moreover, GLB's
expansion of the central bank's powers runs against the trend in many other industrialized
countries.
The effectiveness of a unified supervisory agency in regulating financial
conglomerates or as a response to the challenge of functional despecialization is by no
means certain. It is noteworthy that most of the unified agencies established to date have
preserved the traditional institutional division between banks, securities firms, and
140. Id.
141. The FSA assumed supervisory responsibilities over the banking, securities, and insurance industries from
the Ministry of Finance. For more information on Japan's FSA, see Financial Services Agency, at
http://www.fsa.go.jp/info/infoe/pamphlet e.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2003).
142. See generally PETER HARTCHER, THE MINISTRY: How JAPAN'S MOST POWERFUL INSTITUTION
ENDANGERS WORLD MARKETS (1998).
143. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS:
JAPAN 1996-97, at 51 (1997).
144. CARL-JOHAN LINDGREN ET AL., FINANCIAL SECTOR CRISIS AND RESTRUCTURING: LESSONS FROM ASIA
71 (IMF Occasional Paper 188, 1999).
145. Id. at 72-75.
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insurance companies in their internal organizational structures. 14 6 At a minimum, therefore,
the chief advantages of unified supervision would appear to be the enhanced cooperation
and communication that result from placing different institutionally focused regulators
within a single management structure. No regulatory authority has yet been able to develop
a risk assessment framework that is suitable for assessing the risks in diversified financial
conglomerate groups, although this is the focus of a "complex groups" division created
within Britain's FSA.
Unified financial regulatory agencies may prove less effective than anticipated if their
very broad scope overloads senior management. In addition, unified agencies may be
susceptible to problems of reputational contagion, as regulatory failures-whether apparent
or real-undermine their credibility over the broad range of their responsibilities. Since
their formation, both Australia's APRA and the United Kingdom's FSA have been the
subject of public criticism over their handling of two insurance companies, HIH and
Equitable Life, respectively. In the Australian case, the HIH episode has already prompted
some critics to question the effectiveness of the Wallis reforms, although it is likely that
problems at HIH, like those in Equitable Life, predate the formation of the new agency.
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Nonetheless, if such episodes were to become commonplace, the reputation and
effectiveness of the single regulatory agency might well be undermined.
The rapid evolution of the financial systems of leading industrialized countries over
the past two decades has posed policymakers with a series of profound challenges. The
adoption of unified regulatory agencies is the outcome of attempts to analyze and assess the
implications of these developments for the structure of regulation. GLB's functional
regulatory scheme is not the result of any comprehensive analysis, but rather a slight
variation of the status quo. The Fed's role as umbrella regulator under GLB is at best a
partial and constrained response to the issues that Australia, Germany, Japan, and the
United Kingdom have each sought to address through more radical structural change.
Thus, for example, the Fed's role as umbrella regulator is relevant only to the goals of
safety and soundness and does not address the potential need for a single regulator that is
responsible for all financial regulatory goals, including, for example, consumer protection.
Unified financial sector supervision may not be a universal panacea for the problems
presented by the formation of financial conglomerates and industry despecialization. For
example, it remains to be seen whether a regulatory structure in which the central bank
ceases to have direct supervisory responsibilities will be adequate to deal with episodes of
severe financial stress. For this reason, it is too soon to assess the success or failure of the
radical experiments in countries like Australia and Britain. Nonetheless, of the various
alternatives to unified supervision, we predict that functional regulation will not prevail
because it is a scheme not well suited to the regulation of banks and because it does not
account for blurring of product lines and functional despecialization.
We are certain that the success of regulatory modernization will hinge on
policymakers' ability to remain focused on the ultimate goals of financial regulation.
While we have highlighted the changes in financial markets over the last several decades
and the significance of those changes for lawmakers, the ultimate goals of financial
regulation remain constant. These basic goals are consumer protection, institutional safety
and soundness, and systemic stability. Regulatory modernization can be achieved only
146. However, Britain's FSA has established a "complex groups" division, and APRA is functionally
organized around a distinction between "specialist firms" and "diversified groups."
147. See Graeme Thompson, Perils of the Prudential Regulator, Speech delivered at the Investment and
Finanacial Services Association Annual Conference (Aug. 2, 2001), available at http://www.apra.gov.au/
speeches/Perils-of-the-prudential-regulator.cfm (acknowledging the need to improve community understanding
and public relations) (last visited Mar. 20, 2003).
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through systematic consideration of current market developments and trends and of how
regulatory systems, consistent with regulatory goals, can contend with such evolution.
Relative to other developed countries, the United States' consideration of issues of
regulatory modernization has been perfunctory.
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